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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(Rep. Vol. 9 2007)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the Court below err when it granted summary judgment by concluding that
Plaintiffs failed to come forward with evidence of damages?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court's granting of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness; viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Mountain Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co.. 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from two separate summary judgments entered in the underlying
case.
The Court below granted summary judgment for both defendants on one issue,
damages, holding that Plaintiffs had not come forward with any evidence of damages.
(R. 5368, R, 5358).
Plaintiffs, however, had presented an affidavit of Avner Kalay, a world renowned
economist, which gave a range of damages for Plaintiffs of between $4.2 million and
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$6,706 million. (R. 4645,1114).
Summary of the Claims
In 1998, William Borghetti formed Campus Pipeline, Inc. (A Delaware
Corporation f/k/a Campus Communications; hereafter "CPI"). (R. 1982, p. vii). Mr.
Borghetti and the other Plaintiffs were all shareholders of common stock in CPI. (R.
1855, p. 2). System and Computer Technology (hereinafter "SCT") made capital
contributions to the company in exchange for common stock giving it 60% control over
Campus Communications. (R. 1982, p. vii).
In 1999 and 2000 CPI sold preferred shares in its company which gave the
preferred shareholders the first $80.9 million in the event of a liquidation. (R. 1855, p.67).
In 2002, SCT, the largest and controlling shareholder made an offer to purchase
CPI in a "cash out" merger. (R. 1855, p. 15). Defendant Thomas Weisel Partners, LLC
("TWP") was retained by CPI to perform an appraisal/fairness opinion for CPI. (R. 1855,
p. 15). TWP was only to be paid (a minimum of $800,000.00) if the company was in fact
liquidated. (R. 1855, p. 15 and 16).
On September 5, 2002, the CPI board of directors voted to approve a merger with
SCT. (R. 1855, p. 21). The merger took effect on October 23, 2002 for a price of
$42,000,000. (R. 5368, p.2).
Plaintiffs stock was cancelled as a result of the acquisition, and they received nothing
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(zero consideration) for their shares. (R. 5368, p.2).
Despite the clear interests of the Campus Pipeline common stockholders to reject the
acquisition, Campus Pipeline's directors and officers approved a transaction with SCT that
gave significant value to insiders (money), including the directors and officers who approved
the transaction, and to SCT (the company and its assets), but nothing at all to Campus
Pipeline's common stock. (R. 3957, Ex. NN, lfl[5-14).
Because Borghetti opposed the acquisition, he was entitled under section 262 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) to file an appraisal action in Delaware to
seek a determination of the "fair value" of his shares in CPI as of the effective date of the
acquisition. (R. 5368, p. 7). Section 262 of the DGCL requires that an appraisal action
be filed within 120 days from the effective date of the acquisition. (R. 5368, p. 7).
To address his remedies, Borghetti alleged that he entered into an attorney client
relationship with the Bendinger defendants based upon numerous in person meetings,
phone calls, retention of valuation professionals, and Bendinger's taking of the only copy
of Mr. Borghetti's file. (R. 3957,fflf1-35). The Bendinger defendants continued working
with Mr. Borghetti on his case for over six months, during which time the statute of
limitations for an appraisal action passed. (Id.). The Bendinger Defendants failed to file
an appraisal action within 120 days and failed to advise Borghetti that they were not
going to file such an appraisal action. (R. 3957,ffl[1-35).
Plaintiffs brought this action against System and Computer Techology, Inc. and
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Campus Pipeline's officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
misrepresentation and fraud. In this same litigation one of the Plaintiffs, William
Borghetti, (hereinafter "Borghetti") brought a claim for legal malpractice against
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson and Casey and Jeffrey S. Williams (hereinafter "Bendinger
defendants") for failing to timely file a Delaware state "appraisal action."
Despite the length of their relationship, researching of appraisals and fraud claims,
the hiring of a valuation expert, and six months of in person and telephone meetings, the
Bendinger defendants denied the existence of the attorney client relationship and claimed
that Borghetti suffered no damages.
The SCT defendants claimed that they did their best to sell the corporation at the best
price and that Plaintiffs suffered no damages. They also claimed since they sold at less than
the liquidation preference that Plaintiffs could not show any damages.
Plaintiffs claimed (a) that there was no reason to sell; (b) that there were many other
options available to keep CPI a going concern; (c) that there were substantial conflicts of
interests for all parties that "approved" the transaction; and (d) that Plaintiffs were damaged
as a result of receiving zero consideration for their shares.
Plaintiff William Borghetti ("Borghetti") claimed that CPI should not have
approved the acquisition because it was unfair to the common shareholders since they
received zero consideration.
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The Kalay Opinions and the Opinions of the Defendants' Experts on the issue of
Damages.
Plaintiffs' expert, Avner Kalay is a professor at the David Eccles School of
Business at the University of Utah where he teaches courses in valuation. He received his
B.A. in economics from Tel Aviv University, a Masters in Business Administration from
the University of Rochester and a PhD in Business Administration from the University of
Rochester. (R. 4645, THfl-2). He was a Chairman of the Finance Department at Tel Aviv
University, and a tenured member of NYU's business school faculty. (R. 4645,1fl[3-4).
Professor Kalay has published numerous articles in leading finance journals and formerly
worked as a consultant for the SEC (R. 4645, fflj5-6).
In March 2006 Kalay prepared a valuation report for this matter in which he
utilized an option pricing theory in order to value Campus Pipeline. (R. 3247, exh. C).
Kalay determined that Campus Pipeline had a value of $63.6 million and $72.9 million at
the end of 2002 and that the fair value of the Plaintiffs' shares at the time of the "cash
out" merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706 million. (R. 4645, ft 13-14).
To arrive at that value, Kalay used what is known as the Black-Scholes method of
valuation. (R. 4645,115).
Kalay's conclusions in his report concerning use of the Black-Scholes
methodology are highly supported by the available literature. Fischer Black and Myron
Scholes won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1997 for their work "The Pricing of
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Options and Corporate Liabilities." (R. 4645, ^29b).
The Black-Scholes model is the seminal work in options pricing theory and it has
not only been utilized in valuing options, but has been used to value equity and debt in a
company. (R. 4645, ffl29a).
Nonetheless, the District Court granted summary judgment for both groups of
Defendants on the erroneous conclusion that Plaintiffs did not have evidence of damages.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The granting of summary judgement was incorrect because there was a disputed
fact: the fair value of Plaintiffs' shares at the time of the merger. The district court's
conclusion either disregarded the damage calculation of Avner Kalay, or it incorrectly
concluded that the market value of the company on the date of the merger was the proper
calculation of damages.
Delaware law clearly required that the district court determine the fair value of the
Plaintiffs shares as opposed to the market value of the company. In determining such
fair value, the court was required to take into account all relevant factors, including the
expert opinion of Dr. Kalay.
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
KALAY'S AFFIDAVIT CLEARLY STATED THAT THE FAIR VALUE OF
PLAINTIFFS' SHARES IN CPI WAS BETWEEN $4.2 MILLION AND $6,706
MILLION. THAT FACT, WHILE DISPUTED BY THE DEFENDANTS'
EXPERTS, REQUIRED THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS BE
DENIED.
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues of material fact, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in
a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev.
Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court accords no deference
to a trial court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary judgment, but
reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah
1991). It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v.
Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). The presence of a dispute as to material facts
disallows the granting of a summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562
P.2d 238 (Utah 1977).
In its order granting summary judgment to the SCT defendants, the District Court
stated:
Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact on the question of whether they suffered damages.
Because damages are a necessary element of each of the causes of action
they bring against Defendants, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on an of their claims
as a matter of law. (R. 5358, p 3-4).
That conclusion failed to recognize or account for paragraph 14 of Avner Kalay's
affidavit in opposition to the motions for summary judgment. That paragraph reads:
14.
In the March 2006 report later modified by my deposition testimony,
I concluded that the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shares at the time of the
merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706 million."
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Under both the legal malpractice causes of action and the breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, misrepresentation and fraud causes of action, the measure of the
Plaintiffs' damages was the value of their shares of common stock in CPI at the time of
the merger when they were cancelled. Dr. Kalay's opinion was that they were worth
between four and six million dollars at the time they were cancelled.
Thus, there was a disputed fact: the value of the Plaintiffs' shares. Because there
was a disputed fact, the granting of summary judgment was incorrect and should be
overturned.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MARKET
VALUE OF THE COMPANY ON THE DATE OF THE MERGER WAS THE
ONLY PROPER CALCULATION OF DAMAGES.
In Weinberger v. UOP. Inc.. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme
Court explicitly broadened the interpretation of the Delaware Corporations Code, section
262 on appraisal rights, and adopted a more liberal approach to the valuation process (Id.
at 704). The Court concluded that an exclusive method for valuation was outmoded and a
more liberal approach to stock valuation and appraisal proceedings must include proof of
value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community (Id. at 712). They held that the most popularly employed techniques
for valuation no longer exclusively control appraisal and valuation proceedings, and that
alternative valuation techniques should be allowed. (Id. at 713; See also, Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296-297 (Del. 1996)). The Court in Weinberger further
concluded that when determining the value that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for
that which has been taken from him, a number of relevant factors are to be included. The
-8-

Court stated:
In determining what figure represents [the] true or intrinsic value, the
appraiser and the courts must take into consideration all factors and
elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus,
market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the
enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be
ascertained as of the date of merger and which throw any light on future
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as
to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered
by the agency fixing the value. . . This is not only in accord with the
realities of present day affairs, but it is thoroughly consonant with the
purpose and intent of our statutory law. It is significant that section 262
now mandates the determination of 'fair' value based upon 'all relevant
factors.' Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the
'accomplishment or expectation" of the merger are excluded. We take this
to be a very narrow exception to the appraisal process.... But elements of
future value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or
susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of
speculation, may be considered. (Id. at 713; italics in original)
Thus, not only are acceptable valuation methods to be liberally construed by the Courts,
but, according to Weinberger all the relevant factors should be included when
determining value as well (See Also, Cede & Co. at 295 *).
Even elements of "future value" may be considered. Weinberger and all of its
progeny dictate that "market value" is simply a fact to be used in coming up with "fair

1

The Court in Cede Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. cited and followed Weinberger for the
proposition that the Court must broaden the process for determining fair value, and
factors that are not the product of speculation may be considered when determining value,
including the nature of the enterprise (Cede Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (1996) 684 A.2d 289,
295).
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value."2 In fact the Black-Scholes method used by Kalay utilized market value as a
factor. Kalay first determined the market value of the company to be between $63.6
million and $72.9 million. (R. 4645, |13). Kalay also accounted for the liquidation
preference of approximately $82 million. Kalay utilized those figures and others to come
up with the "fair value" of Plaintiffs shares (the range of the "fair value" lost was between
$4.2 million and $6,706 million).
Utah has also adopted a broad and liberal interpretation of the valuation methods
that are allowed. In Bingham Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck. 2004 UT App 434, 105
P.3d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that the goal of
appraisal is to ascertain the actual worth of that which the dissenter loses . . . there are no
fixed methods for valuating the shares, and most courts permit all generally accepted
techniques of valuation used in the financial community. (Id. at 370, citing Oakridge
Energy Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1997), See also, Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma
Corp.. 747 A.2d 549, 556 (Del. 2000)). They concluded that they are in agreement with
other jurisdictions that, "a court should make use of all generally accepted techniques of
valuation used in the financial community." (Bingham at 375, See also, Paskill Corp. at
556).

2

This is precisely why defendant's own expert stated that shares can be "out of
the money" yet still have value. An "out of the money" scenario is exactly what we have
here because the liquidation preference exceeds market value. Commons shareholders in
these scenarios must have protection - otherwise, they can be frozen out at any time for
any reason.
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Defendants' own expert, Grabowski, in his expert report of May 31, 2006 points
out this exact contention. He states that, "The Black-Scholes option pricing model is
widely accepted in the financial community as a methodology to estimate the price of an
option, or derivative instrument, and . .. may be used in certain instances to provide the
value of the equity of a company under financial distress." (R. 1982, Ex. W, Grabowski
Report, p. 14).
Pursuant to both Delaware and Utah law the Court should have liberally and
broadly interpreted what valuation methods are to be allowed in such proceedings as this.
The area of valuation is no longer controlled exclusively by certain methods, and those
formulas and techniques which are generally accepted in the financial community are now
clearly allowed by the Courts. (See, Weinberger at 712 and Bingham Consolidation at
370).
In stating that the Plaintiffs could not show damages, the District Court erred in
two ways.
First, as shown above, market value is not solely determinative of "fair value."
Second, and more importantly, The market value of $73.7 million to $83.2 million
cited by the Court was Professor Kalay's determination that Campus Pipeline as an entity
had a market value of that amount at the time of the merger. Section 262 and the cases
clearly state that the court is to determine the fair value of the shares on the date of the
merger - not the company. It is a distinction that is not splitting hairs.
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CPI was founded in 1998. In 2002, it was still clearly a start up venture. It is not
surprising that the stock was "out of the money." Google, Yahoo, and any other startup
company experiences a period of initial capitalization where expenditures exceed
earnings. The Defendants' own expert acknowledged that "out of the money" stock still
has value. For that reason, section 262 and the Delaware and Utah cases require that the
value of the shares be determined - not the book, asset, or market value of the company.
Each share of stock at the time of the merger was like owning a lottery ticket. If the
company succeeded, they would have value. If the company ultimately failed, they would
be worthless. The Plaintiffs had the right to continue to hold those shares and have the
company continue in business.
Just like a losing lottery ticket has no value - a potentially winning lottery ticket
clearly has a value. CPI had not failed. Its stock clearly had a value or expectation
interest. Dr. Kalay's opinion used Nobel prize winning methods to determine that value.
It was the Defendants' experts who failed to provide any legitimate value. They-like the
court-used market value of the company. It is axiomatic that a share of stock that shows
any possibility of success, has a value.
Instead of realizing on that value the common shareholders were given nothing.
At the same time, the conflicted directors, the conflicted officers, and the controlling
shareholder all walked away with either substantial cash payments or the company itself.
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CONCLUSION
The Court below erred in simply looking at Professor Kalay's calculation of
market value and holding such figures to be the "end all, be a i r in this action. Instead,
the Court below should have focused on the "fair value" damage calculation from
Professor Kalay. That fair value damage calculation clearly and undoubtedly shows that
Plaintiffs suffered damages of between $4.2 million and $6,706 million. Respectfully, the
Appellants request that both Summary Judgment Orders and Judgments be vacated and
reversed and the case remanded for trial below.

STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM
Attached as an addendum are:
1. Delaware Corporations Code, section 262
2. Affidavit of Avner Kalay
3. Affidavit of Daniel Greenwood

Dated this J

day of October, 2007

(JJA^
Curas L. Wenger,
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Salt Lake County, Utah. I am
over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business
address is City Centre I, 175 East 400 South, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. I am
readily familiar with this firm's practice for collection and processing of correspondence
for mailing with the United States' Postal Service, Federal Express and hand delivery.
On August 12,-£Q64f I placed for delivery via U.S. Mail two true and correct copies of the
within document, APPELLANT'S BRIEF in a sealed envelope, to the following:

John Pearce
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stuart Schultz
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
And, one original and nine copies of APPELLANT'S BRIEF were served,
[ ] via United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, to:
[ ] via hand delivery
to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
I declare that I am employed in the office of an attorney that has been
admitted to this Court at whose direction the service was made.
Executed on October 5, 2007 at Salt Lake City, Utah.

-14-

CWEST'S DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 8. CORPORATIONS
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
SUBCHAPTER IX. MERGER, CONSOLIDATION OR CONVERSION
-•§ 262. Appraisal rights

(a) Any stockholder of a corporation of this State who holds shares of stock on the
date of the making of a demand pursuant to subsection (d) of this section with
respect to such shares, who continuously holds such shares through the effective
date of the merger or consolidation, who has otherwise complied with subsection (d)
of this section and who has neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation
nor consented thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title shall be entitled
to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder's
shares of stock under the circumstances described in subsections (b) and (c) of this
section. As used in this section, the word "stockholder" means a holder of record
of stock in a stock corporation and also a member of record of a nonstock
corporation; the words "stock" and "share" mean and include what is ordinarily
meant by those words and also membership or membership interest of a member of a
nonstock corporation; and the words "depository receipt" mean a receipt or other
instrument issued by a depository representing an interest in one or more shares, or
fractions thereof, solely of stock of a corporation, which stock is deposited with
the depository.

(b) Appraisal rights shall be available for the shares of any class or series of
stock of a constituent corporation in a merger or consolidation to be effected
pursuant to § 251 (other than a merger effected pursuant to § 251(g) of this title),
§ 252, § 254, § 257, § 258, § 263 or § 264 of this title:

(1) Provided, however, that no appraisal rights under this section shall be
available for the shares of any class or series of stock, which stock, or
depository receipts in respect thereof, at the record date fixed to determine the
stockholders entitled to receive notice of and to vote at the meeting of
stockholders to act upon the agreement of merger or consolidation, were either (i)
listed on a national securities exchange or (ii) held of record by more than 2,000
holders; and further provided that no appraisal rights shall be available for any
shares of stock of the constituent corporation surviving a merger if the merger
did not require for its approval the vote of the stockholders of the surviving
corporation as provided in subsection (f) of § 251 of this title.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, appraisal rights under this
section shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock of a
constituent corporation if the holders thereof are required by the terms of an
agreement of merger or consolidation pursuant to §§ 251, 252, 254, 257, 258, 263
and 264 of this title to accept for such stock anything except:

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

a. Shares of stock of the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or
consolidation, or depository receipts in respect thereof;

b. Shares of stock of any other corporation, or depository receipts in respect
thereof, which shares of stock (or depository receipts in respect thereof) or
depository receipts at the effective date of the merger or consolidation will be
either listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than
2,000 holders;

c. Cash in lieu of fractional shares or fractional depository receipts described
in the foregoing subparagraphs a. and b. of this paragraph; or

d. Any combination of the shares of stock, depository receipts and cash in lieu
of fractional shares or fractional depository receipts described in the foregoing
subparagraphs a., b. and c. of this paragraph.

(3) In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation party to a
merger effected under § 253 of this title is not owned by the parent corporation
immediately prior to the merger, appraisal rights shall be available for the
shares of the subsidiary Delaware corporation.

(c) Any corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that appraisal
rights under this section shall be available for the shares of any class or series
of its stock as a result of an amendment to its certificate of incorporation, any
merger or consolidation in which the corporation is a constituent corporation or the
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation. If the
certificate of incorporation contains such a provision, the procedures of this
section, including those set forth in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, shall
apply as nearly as is practicable.

(d) Appraisal rights shall be perfected as follows:

(1) If a proposed merger or consolidation for which appraisal rights are provided
under this section is to be submitted for approval at a meeting of stockholders,
the corporation, not less than 20 days prior to the meeting, shall notify each of
its stockholders who was such on the record date for such meeting with respect to
shares for which appraisal rights are available pursuant to subsection (b) or (c)
hereof that appraisal rights are available for any or all of the shares of the
constituent corporations, and shall include in such notice a copy of this section.
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Each stockholder electing to demand the appraisal of such stockholder's shares
shall deliver to the corporation, before the taking of the vote on the merger or
consolidation, a written demand for appraisal of such stockholder's shares. Such
demand will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity
of the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the
appraisal of such stockholder's shares. A proxy or vote against the merger or
consolidation shall not constitute such a demand. A stockholder electing to take
such action must do so by a separate written demand as herein provided. Within 10
days after the effective date of such merger or consolidation, the surviving or
resulting corporation shall notify each stockholder of each constituent
corporation who has complied with this subsection and has not voted in favor of or
consented to the merger or consolidation of the date that the merger or
consolidation has become effective; or

(2) If the merger or consolidation was approved pursuant to § 228 or § 253 of this
title, then either a constituent corporation before the effective date of the
merger or consolidation or the surviving or resulting corporation within 10 days
thereafter shall notify each of the holders of any class or series of stock of
such constituent corporation who are entitled to appraisal rights of the approval
of the merger or consolidation and that appraisal rights are available for any or
all shares of such class or series of stock of such constituent corporation, and
shall include in such notice a copy of this section. Such notice may, and, if
given on or after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, shall, also
notify such stockholders of the effective date of the merger or consolidation.
Any stockholder entitled to appraisal rights may, within 20 days after the date of
mailing of such notice, demand in writing from the surviving or resulting
corporation the appraisal of such holder's shares. Such demand will be sufficient
if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of the stockholder and
that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the appraisal of such holder's
shares. If such notice did not notify stockholders of the effective date of the
merger or consolidation, either (i) each such constituent corporation shall send a
second notice before the effective date of the merger or consolidation notifying
each of the holders of any class or series of stock of such constituent
corporation that are entitled to appraisal rights of the effective date of the
merger or consolidation or (ii) the surviving or resulting corporation shall send
such a second notice to all such holders on or within 10 days after such effective
date; provided, however, that if such second notice is sent more than 20 days
following the sending of the first notice, such second notice need only be sent to
each stockholder who is entitled to appraisal rights and who has demanded
appraisal of such holder's shares in accordance with this subsection. An
affidavit of the secretary or assistant secretary or of the transfer agent of the
corporation that is required to give either notice that such notice has been given
shall, in the absence of fraud, be prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. For purposes of determining the stockholders entitled to receive either
notice, each constituent corporation may fix, in advance, a record date that shall
be not more than 10 days prior to the date the notice is given, provided, that if
the notice is given on or after the effective date of the merger or consolidation,
the record date shall be such effective date. If no record date is fixed and the
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notice is given prior to the effective date, the record date shall be the close of
business on the day next preceding the day on which the notice is given.

(e) Within 120 days after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, the
surviving or resulting corporation or any stockholder who has complied with
subsections (a) and (d) hereof and who is otherwise entitled to appraisal rights,
may commence an appraisal proceeding by filing a petition in the Court of Chancery
demanding a determination of the value of the stock of all such stockholders.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, at any time within 60 days after the effective date
of the merger or consolidation, any stockholder who has not commenced an appraisal
proceeding or joined that proceeding as a named party shall have the right to
withdraw such stockholder's demand for appraisal and to accept the terms offered
upon the merger or consolidation. Within 120 days after the effective date of the
merger or consolidation, any stockholder who has complied with the requirements of
subsections (a) and (d) hereof, upon written request, shall be entitled to receive
from the corporation surviving the merger or resulting from the consolidation a
statement setting forth the aggregate number of shares not voted in favor of the
merger or consolidation and with respect to which demands for appraisal have been
received and the aggregate number of holders of such shares. Such written statement
shall be mailed to the stockholder within 10 days after such stockholder's written
request for such a statement is received by the surviving or resulting corporation
or within 10 days after expiration of the period for delivery of demands for
appraisal under subsection (d) hereof, whichever is later. Notwithstanding
subsection (a) of this section, a person who is the beneficial owner of shares of
such stock held either in a voting trust or by a nominee on behalf of such person
may, in such person's own name, file a petition or request from the corporation the
statement described in this subsection.

(f) Upon the filing of any such petition by a stockholder, service of a copy thereof
shall be made upon the surviving or resulting corporation, which shall within 20
days after such service file in the office of the Register in Chancery in which the
petition was filed a duly verified list containing the names and addresses of all
stockholders who have demanded payment for their shares and with whom agreements as
to the value of their shares have not been reached by the surviving or resulting
corporation. If the petition shall be filed by the surviving or resulting
corporation, the petition shall be accompanied by such a duly verified list. The
Register in Chancery, if so ordered by the Court, shall give notice of the time and
place fixed for the hearing of such petition by registered or certified mail to the
surviving or resulting corporation and to the stockholders shown on the list at the
addresses therein stated. Such notice shall also be given by 1 or more publications
at least 1 week before the day of the hearing, in a newspaper of general circulation
published in the City of Wilmington, Delaware or such publication as the Court deems
advisable. The forms of the notices by mail and by publication shall be approved by
the Court, and the costs thereof shall be borne by the surviving or resulting
corporation.
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(g) At the hearing on such petition, the Court shall determine the stockholders who
have complied with this section and who have become entitled to appraisal rights.
The Court may require the stockholders who have demanded an appraisal for their
shares and who hold stock represented by certificates to submit their certificates
of stock to the Register in Chancery for notation thereon of the pendency of the
appraisal proceedings; and if any stockholder fails to comply with such direction,
the Court may dismiss the proceedings as to such stockholder.

(h) After the Court determines the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the
appraisal proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of the Court of
Chancery, including any rules specifically governing appraisal proceedings. Through
such proceeding the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined
to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into
account all relevant factors. Unless the Court in its discretion determines
otherwise for good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger
through the date of payment of the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall
accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as
established from time to time during the period between the effective date of the
merger and the date of payment of the judgment. Upon application by the surviving
or resulting corporation or by any stockholder entitled to participate in the
appraisal proceeding, the Court may, in its discretion, proceed to trial upon the
appraisal prior to the final determination of the stockholders entitled to an
appraisal. Any stockholder whose name appears on the list filed by the surviving or
resulting corporation pursuant to subsection (f) of this section and who has
submitted such stockholder's certificates of stock to the Register in Chancery, if
such is required, may participate fully in all proceedings until it is finally
determined that such stockholder is not entitled to appraisal rights under this
section.

(i) The Court shall direct the payment of the fair value of the shares, together
with interest, if any, by the surviving or resulting corporation to the stockholders
entitled thereto. Payment shall be so made to each such stockholder, in the case of
holders of uncertificated stock forthwith, and the case of holders of shares
represented by certificates upon the surrender to the corporation of the
certificates representing such stock. The Court's decree may be enforced as other
decrees in the Court of Chancery may be enforced, whether such surviving or
resulting corporation be a corporation of this State or of any state.

(j) The costs
of the proceeding may be determined by the Court and taxed upon the
parties as the Court deems equitable in the circumstances. Upon application of a
stockholder, the Court may order all or a portion of the expenses incurred by any
stockholder in connection with the appraisal proceeding, including, without
limitation, reasonable attorney's fees and the fees and expenses of experts, to be
charged pro rata against the value of all the shares entitled to an appraisal.
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(k) From and after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, no stockholder
who has demanded appraisal rights as provided in subsection (d) of this section
shall be entitled to vote such stock for any purpose or to receive payment of
dividends or other distributions on the stock (except dividends or other
distributions payable to stockholders of record at a date which is prior to the
effective date of the merger or consolidation); provided, however, that if no
petition for an appraisal shall be filed within the time provided in subsection (e)
of this section, or if such stockholder shall deliver to the surviving or resulting
corporation a written withdrawal of such stockholder's demand for an appraisal and
an acceptance of the merger or consolidation, either within 60 days after the
effective date of the merger or consolidation as provided in subsection (e) of this
section or thereafter with the written approval of the corporation, then the right
of such stockholder to an appraisal shall cease. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no
appraisal proceeding in the Court of Chancery shall be dismissed as to any
stockholder without the approval of the Court, and such approval may be conditioned
upon such terms as the Court deems just; provided, however that this provision shall
not affect the right of any stockholder who has not commenced an appraisal
proceeding or joined that proceeding as a named party to withdraw such stockholder's
demand for appraisal and to accept the terms offered upon the merger or
consolidation within 60 days after the effective date of the merger or
consolidation, as set forth m subsection (e) of this section.

(1) The shares of the surviving or resulting corporation to which the shares of such
objecting stockholders would have been converted had they assented to the merger or
consolidation shall have the status of authorized and unissued shares of the
surviving or resulting corporation.

Current through 76 Laws 2007, ch. 181. Revisions to Acts made by
the Delaware Code Revisors were unavailable at time of publication.

Copr. © 2007 Thomson/West.
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AFFIDAVIT O F AVNER KALAY
I, Avner Kalay, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: I have
personal knowledge of the items contained in this affidavit and would testify consistent
hereto if I were called to testify.
1. I am a professor of Finance at the University of Utah David Eccles School of
Business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. I received my B.A. in economics from Tel Aviv University in 1973, my M.S
in Business Administration from the University of Rochester in 1977 and a
Ph.D in Business Administration from the University of Rochester in 1979.
3. 1 was a member of NYU's finance department during 1978-1987, and was
tenured at NYU in 1985
4. I have previously been the Chairman of the Finance Department at Tel Aviv
University, and presently am still a professor of finance there.
5. I have also worked for the Securities and Exchange Commission as a
consultant in Washington, DC.
6. I have been published numerous times in journals in the finance community
and co-wrote Dividend Policy; Its Impact on Value, in 1999.
7. I am co-founder and co-organizer of the Utah Winter Finance Conference held
every year since 1991.
8 -I have served as an expert witness in a number of cases involving business
valuations, including but not limited to, MCN Energy V Crown Asphalt
Corporation, Etrade V LifeWise, and SCO V. IBM.
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9. I have been a consultant for numerous companies operating in different
industries, including Coco Cola, American Express, Intel, Hermes Associates,
among others.
10. hi a recent ranking of financial economists by citation to their work in top
finance journals from 1974-1998 ranked me at the top 100 in the world.
11.1 have participated in over 50 professional conferences as a presenter,
discussant, and session chair on a range of financial issues, and I give frequent
lectures about my research at other universities.
12. On or about March 2006 I prepared a valuation report for Plaintiffs in this
mattei.
13 In my report I determined that Campus Pipeline at the time of acquisition had
an approximate value of $73.7 million to $83.2 million.
14. In the March 2006 report later modified by my deposition testimony, I
concluded that the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shaies at the time of the
merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706 million.
15. In my report I employed a widely used and generally accepted valuation
method called the Black-Scholes model, developed by Fischer Black and
Myron Scholes in 1973 as a method used to value options.
16 In my report I point out that the Black-Scholes method is an appropriate
method for valuing equity in a levered firm, because equity in a levered firm,
such as Campus Pipeline, can be viewed as a call option to buy the assets of
the firm (Report, 9).

17. The Black Scholes option pricing model is an appropriate valuation model for
equity in a levered firm whether or not the firm is in financial distress or
operational distress. It is not disputed that Campus Pipeline had "debt-like"
potential obligation to its preferred stockholders. So whether or not Campus
Pipeline was in financial distress or in operational distress the Black Scholes
option pricing model can be used to value its equity.
18. The appraisal action statute in Delaware provides that value the court
considers is the fair value of the shares. Delaware Corporations Code, section
262(h): "After determining the stockholders entitled to an appraisal the Court
shall appraise the shares, detemiining their fair value exclusive of any element
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the
Court shall take into account all relevant factors."
19. Campus Pipeline at the time of acquisition had preferred stockholders, and
holders of Series A and B preferred stock were to be paid the sum of $82.93
million in the event of liquidation, prior to any payment to the common
stockholders. Because of this large liquidation preference the preferred stock
shares were debt like in nature making Campus Pipeline a highly levered firm
(See, Kalay Report 9-10 "Equity in a levered firm can be viewed as a call
option to buy the assets of the firm .. . The analogy to the case of Campus
Pipeline is straightforward. Campus Pipeline, at the time of the acquisition by
SCT, had almost no long-term debt. Y e t . . . holders of Series A and B

preferred stock are to be paid the sum of $82.93 million in the event of
liquidation prior to any payment to the common stockholders."; See
Grabowski Report 13-] 4 "Campus Pipeline is considered to be a highly
levered firm because of the large liquidation preference ($82.9 million) of the
preferred shares, which are debt-like in nature.").
20. Pursuant to the literature on the subject and the research I have encountered,
along with my education, experience and training, it is clear that BlackScholes is the seminal work in options pricing theory, is the most widely used
and most recognized model for the valuation of options and has not only been
employed to value options, but also to value equity and debt in a company like
Campus Pipeline.
21. In reviewing Defendant's expert report prepared by Roger Grabowski, I
noticed that despite Grabowski *s deposition testimony that my use of the
Black-Scholes model was inappropriate because Black-Scholes is generally
used to value publicly traded companies, Grabowski himself in his report
discusses the model's use in the area of real options where the underlying
asset is not traded.
22. Grabowski's report on Campus Pipeline even mentions that the Black-Scholes
method is utilized in the financial community and is also utilized in some
circumstances, to value the equity of a company.
23. In my opinion, the discount cash flow analysis, used by Hoffman and
Grabowski, can result in undervaluing of the firm because that analysis does

not capture certain complexities and nuances that the Black-Scholes option
pricing theory does.
24. My report assumes that no acquisition took place, and is dependent on the
assumption that CPI continued to operate for 9 to 13 years, but the methods
employed by Defendant's expert, the Discounted Cash Flow Analysis, also
makes these same assumptions.
25. The income approach, market approach, and cost approach are generally
accepted valuation methodologies, and the Black-Scholes method is also
generally accepted and has been in use since 1973. It is in fact an "income
approach" method.
26. Valuation guidelines state clearly that when a good estimate of the market
value is available it is best to use it. I use the price paid for Campus Pipeline
as the starting point of my evaluation of the market value of its equity. That 1
use the price paid for Campus Pipeline to compute its full market value is my
use of the market approach. Thus my analysis is consistent with the income
approach as well as the market approach.
27. The "bad act" discussed in my report is relevant only to the issue as to
whether Campus Pipeline should have been sold from the financial economics
perspective. It is not utilized in my calculation of fair value and has no effect
on the fair value issue.
28. Attached is my expert report which is tme, accurate, reliable, and provides
my opinion in this case other than the error in the final calculation corrected

by me in my deposition, such that Borghetti's damages range from $4.2
million to $6,706 million.
29. The following is some of the authoritative literature that I believe supports my
conclusions on the use of the Black-Scholes methodology (along with other
literature cited in my deposition):
a. The Black-Scholes model is the seminal work in options pricing theoiy
and it has not only been utilized in valuing options, but has been used
to value equity and debt in a company. (See generally, Damodaran,
Mwath

-

Investment Valuation- Tnnls and Techniques for

BelermininaAe^lHcoMnv Asset. 2nd Ed. New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. 1996, page 828-829).
b. Scholes and [Robert] Merton shared the 1997 Nobel Prize in
economics for their work on the development of this formula
(Brealey, Richard A., and Stuart C. Myers, and Alan J. Marcus.
Fundamentals of Corporate Finance. 4th F.d New York: McGraw Hill
Companies, Inc., 2004, page 651)
c

An options approach to valuation has been cited as a powerful tool in
the financial community because it allows an analyst to capture certain
complexities and nuances . . [and] using the risk adjusted discount
rate version of the discount cash flow (DCF) analysis can result in
overlooking an important option that is available and substantially
undervaluing the firm. (See, Boer, Peter F. The Real Options Solution-

Finding Total Value in a High-Risk World New York John Wiley &
Sons, Lie, pp vn, 95, 100)
d

It has been heavily cited and discussed that equity can be viewed as a
call option and therefore one would value equity as an option using the
option pricing technique (See, Damodaran, Aswath (2006) The Cost
of Distiess Survival Truncation Risk and Valuation Social Science
Research Network http //ssrn com/abstract=887129, pages 2, 36)

e

Equity is a kind of option on the assets (See, Callaghan, Clark and
JackAyei (1999) Good News for the Black Scholes Suffeieis No 1
Norton Bankr L Adviser 7)

f

Since 1973, the Black-Scholes-Merton methodology has been applied
to a wide variety of contingent claims Financial guaiantees can be
analyzed as put options, and the equity of a levered firm can be
analyzed as a call option on the firm's assets " (Gray, D and Robeit
Merton and Zvi Bodie "A New Framework for Analyzing and
Managing Maciofinancial Risks " Piepared foi the CV Stan/RED
Confeience on Finance and the Macioeconomy, October 11-12, 2002
New York, N Y , page 4)

g

Some analysts have found that it is possible to considei a company's
equity as a call option, wherein the underlying asset is the value of the
company's debt In this context, option pricing models, such as the
Black-Scholes model can be used for valuing a target's equity (Feins,

Kenneth R. and Barbara S. Petitt Valuation: Avoiding the Winner's
Curse. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.2002, pagel26).
h. In an article entitled "IS: Valuation Methods: Insights from Capital
Markets Theory and Practice," Tim Weitzel, Cornelia Gel lings, Dauiel
Beimborn and Wolfgang Konig, explore the use of the Real Options
Approach for valuing information systems (IS) and information
technology (IT) businesses. They state that "IS valuation has long
been a core research challenge [and] real options approaches have
received attention as methodological means of overcoming some
shortcomings of traditional valuation approaches like net present value
.. . The real options approach employs the financial option theory
based on the Black-Scholes formula. (Beimborn, Daniel and Cornelia
(Sellings, Wolfgang Konig, Tim Weitzel. (2003). "IS Valuation
Methods: Insights from Capital Markets Theory and Practice."
Presented at the 7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems,
July 10-13, 2003, Adelaide, South Australia, pp. 1,10)/
.

In the article entitled "High Stakes in High Technology: High-Tech
Market Values as Options," authors Michael Darby, Qiao Liu, and
Lynne Zucker explore the theory that a high tech firm can be valued
using option theory. They state that "because we know that
achievement of technological breakthroughs - or failure to achieve
them in R&D project, affects the firm's market valuation, we expect
that a certain type of discontinuity in the firm's market value will

occur whenever the firm makes frontier discoveries or announces
failure . . . we take a "traditional view" of treating the firm's equity
value as a call option written on the firm's valued assets .. " (Darby,
Michael and Qiao Liu and Lynne Zucker. (2004) "High Stakes in High
Technology: High-Tech Market Values as Options." Economic
Inquiry, Vol.42, No.3: 351-369 at 352).
j.

Aswath Damodaran, professor of Finance at the Stern School of
Business at NYU teaches equity valuation and financing courses, and
in his book, Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for
Determining the Value of Any Asset he utilizes the Black-Scholes
model to determine the values of equity and debt in a firm. He says
that equity is a call option on the value of the firm and therefore
employs the option pricing technique. (Damodaran, A (2002).
Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining; the
Value of Any Asset 2nd Ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, page
828).

k. Many in the field have deemed option pricing theory a viable
alternative to other traditional valuation models Because of
limitations associated with the implementation of other traditional
valuation models, the 1990's saw the development of a number of
alternative valuation frameworks .. . Discounted cash flow analysis
(DCFA) assumes the capital structure of a company is stable over
time. In the case of a leveraged buy-out or a debt restructuring after a

meiger or an acquisition, the analyst needs an alternative approach that
ovei comes the assumption of stable capital structuie underlying DCFA
Finally, where investments are structured as sequential rounds of
financing, some analysts have found it useful to model the valuation
using real options analysis (Ferns, K Petitt, B Valuation Avoiding
the Winner's Curse. Financial Times Prentice Hall Books, New York,
NY 2002, page 108)
In a papei by Andieas Chantou and Lenos Tugeoigis, the authois
point out that the equity of a levered firm can be viewed as a call
option to acqune the value of the fnm's assets, and they employ the
option pricing theory 01 contingent claims analysis introduced by the
seminal work of Black and Scholes and Merton They further discuss
how the Black and Sholes and Merton woik of option valuation or
contingent claim analysis has been applied to the valuation of vauous
corporate secunties seen as packages of claims oi options on the total
value of the firm's assets (Chantou, Andieas and Lenos Trigeons
Option-Based Bankiuptcv Prediction Social Science Reseaich
Network June 2000)
Black-Scholes applies to contingent claims, theiefore you ought to be
able to analyze all kinds of assets using Black-Scholes techniques
(See, Callaghan, Clark and Jack Ayei (1999) Good News foi Black
Scholes Sufferers No 1 Norton BankrL Advisei 7, 10)

n. The options pricing method takes into account factors that the other
methods may ignore, such as flexibility of the firm and distress of the
firm. The option pricing method captures the value of a firm's
flexibility and takes into account the company's distress as well, and
when dealing with a distressed firm, you have to consider that the
equity of the firm takes on option characteristics. (See, Copeland, T.,
and Tim Roller and Jack Murrin. (1994) Valuation: Measuring and
Managing the Value of Companies. New York: McKinsey &
Company, Inc., page 399; See Also, Damodaran, Aswath. (2006) The
Cost of Distress: Survival. Truncation Risk and Valuation Social
Science Research Network: http://ssrnxom/abstract=887129, pages 2,
36).
o. The more traditional valuation methods such as the risk adjusted
discount rate version of the Discounted Cash Flow analysis (DCF A),
tends to underestimate the value of a firm's equity. Most DCF
valuation approaches only define a single scenario . . . DCF valuations
[can] underestimate the value of the firm .. . because they ignore the
options that these firms have to invest more in the fiiture and take
advantage of unexpected success in their businesses. These options
are increasingly called "real options" because the underlying assets are
real investments, and they might explain, at least in some cases why
discounted cash flows understate the value of technology firms .
(Roos, G and Oliver Gupta. (2001) "Valuation of Private Technology

Firms: A Discussion Paper on Dealing with the Associated Problems.
Intellectual Capital Services, pp 24-25)
p. The discounted cash flow models understate the value of equity in
firms with high financial leverage and negative operating income,
since they do not reflect the option that equity investors have to
liquidate the firm's assets. Black and Scholes suggest that the equity
in a levered firm can be thought of as a call option (Pengfei, H and
Hua Yimin. (2002) Real Option Valuation in High-Tech Firm.
Gothenburg University School of Economics and Commercial Law,
pp. 41-42)
q. The field of finance has developed a variety of option pricing models
with the fundamental ones being the binomial model and the BlackScholes model option pricing models. Over time, these models and
their extensions have been used in a variety of evaluative settings
(Benaroch, Michel and Robert Kauffman. (1999) "A Case for Using
ReaI_Options Pricing Analysis to Evaluate Information Technology
Project Investments." Information Systems Research, Vol. 10,
No. 1-70-86)
The Black-Scholes method is currently the most recognized and
widely used theoretical model foi the valuation of options. (Hitchner,
James R. Financial Valuations: Applications and Models. Hoboken:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003, page 927)

s. The Black-Scholes model now seems to be by far the most important
single breakthrough of the "golden decade," and ranks with the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem and the CAPM of Sharpe and Lintner in
its overall importance for financial theory and practice. (Duffie,
Darrell. (1992) Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, page xiii).
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Beverly Hills, CA 90212
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM BORGHETTI, MICHELLE
BORGHETTI, LA DOZZINA SPORCA,
LLC, LA FAMIGLIA BORGHETTI,
LLC, CAMPUS PIPELINE, INC,
(DERIVATIVELY)
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SYSTEM & COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a corporation;
THOMAS LEWIS JR., DARIN GILSON,
CHAD MUIR, FRED HARMON, DAVID
PETERSCHMIDT, DAVID GARDNER,
ALLEN FRIEDMAN, ERIC HASKELL,
MICHAEL CHAMBERLAIN, DAVID
MURRAY, ANDY COOLEY, SCOTT
DOUGHMAN, JOHN DUNN, TYLER
THATCHER, THOMAS WEISEL
PARTNERS, SUNGUARD/SCT, Inc.,
CAMPUS PIPELINE, INC., FRED
HARMAN, OAK INVESTMENT
PARTNERS, BENDINGER, CROCKETT,
PETERSON AND CASE, a professional
corporation, JEFFREY S. WILLIAMS, and
Does 1 to 100, inclusive..
Defendants
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AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL
GREENWOOD IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO.: 040921012
JUDGE: John Paul Kennedy

I, Daniel Greenwood, being first duly sworn, deposes and state as follows: I have
personal knowledge of the items contained in this Affidavit and would testify consistent
hereto if I were called to testify.
1. I am a Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University
of Utah, where I have been employed since 1992.
2. I am a graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School.
3. After I graduated from law school I clerked for the Honorable Richard Owen,
USDJ, in the Southern District of New York and then practiced corporate
litigation as an associate attorney with Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton for
several years.
4. My major area of academic research is the theory and practice of corporate
governance, with a special emphasis on the relationships of the various parties
to the corporation as governed by the law of fiduciary duty.
5. My opinions stated below are based on the evidence I have reviewed in this
case, my knowledge of general principles and goals of corporate governance
in general and the funding of start-up companies specifically, and the case law
of Delaware, Utah and other American jurisdictions.
6. The circumstances in the Campus Pipeline, Inc. ("Campus Pipeline"), and
System & Computer Technology, Inc. ("SCT"), transaction involve the
important fiduciary obligations that insiders and dominant shareholders have
toward minority, passive, shareholders in closely held corporations. Since
minority shareholders in closely held corporations are particularly susceptible
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to exploitation by over-reaching insiders, courts are especially careful to
impose high fiduciary duties.
7. The directors and managers of Campus Pipeline violated their duty of loyalty
by placing the interests of managers in retaining their job, of insiders
including SCT, of preferred shareholders, and of continuing development of
the product, above the interest of common shareholders in obtaining value for
their shares. Had they not done so, they would have decided that selling the
company at that time was not in the best interests of the company and its
stockholders. Moreover, once they made the decision to sell the company,
they failed to fulfill their Revlon duty to maximize the return to shareholders
in a sale.
8. The directors and managers of Campus Pipeline violated their duty of care by
failing to employ appropriate outside experts, by instructing their expert to
limit its inquiry to such a degree as to make the expert opinion meaningless,
by failing to explore possible alternative transactions that would have created
more value for the common shares, and by deciding to enter into a transaction
that offered the common shares no value while giving significant value to
insiders.
9. SCT - the dominant shareholder - benefited at the expense of and detriment
to the other shareholders, because the sale of Campus Pipeline to SCT allowed
SCT to acquire the assets of Campus Pipeline with no payment to Campus
Pipeline's common stock.
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10. The managers, inside directors and dominant shareholder of Campus Pipeline
had serious conflicts of interest, which they allowed to distort their judgment
and deflect them from their clear legal duties.
11. The individual insiders received valuable compensation, retention bonuses
and other payments in connection with the sale of Campus Pipeline and thus
had a financial interest in consummating the sale regardless of whether it was
in the interest of Campus Pipeline or its outside stockholders. SCT, the
dominant shareholder, received the assets and business of Campus Pipeline
without making a payment to the other common shareholders and thus had an
interest in minimizing the sales price in conflict with the interest of the outside
stockholders. These financial interests created a conflict of interest and
precluding their acting as independent brokers of the fate of the common
stock.
12. The independent directors of Campus Pipeline failed to insist on independent
financial and legal advice, failed to conduct an independent investigation into
the merits of the proposed transaction from the perspective of the common
stock as a whole, and allowed themselves to be used for the interests of the
insiders in breach of their duties of care and loyalty.
13. Thomas Weisel Partners, who were employed by the directors to evaluate the
proposed transaction, was financially interested in the transaction as a holder
of Campus Pipeline preferred stock, with financial interests at odds with those
of the common stock.
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14. The financial interests of the common stock barred this transaction, which
voluntarily eliminated their interests in a going concern without any payment
whatsoever. A Board of Directors acting in the interest of the company and
its common stock would not have chosen to voluntarily sell Campus Pipeline
for a sum less than the preference value of the preferred stock. At any sale
price below the preference value, the common stock would receive nothing,
which is the worst possible outcome for the common stock. Thus, any course
of action that offered the common shareholders any possibility of future value
would have been preferable from the perspective of the common stock.
15. Fundamental principles of corporate law require that the directors act in the
interest of all the common stock, and not merely the majority shareholder.
16. In the venture capital context, it is routine for investors to negotiate the right
to close down the company at various points if it is not doing well. No such
agreement appears to be applicable here. Given the prevalence of such
agreements, its absence should be seen as a contractual acceptance of the
usual rule that when the interests of the common stock conflict with those of
the preferred stock, the law requires the directors to put the interests of the
common stock first. This is particularly true where, as here, the directors
propose to exclude the common stock from any interest in the company's
future, thus destroying the entire economic basis of the common stock.
17. Since the sale of Campus Pipeline to SCT gave no value to the common stock,
it cannot have been in the interest of the common stock. Therefore, the
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director's approval of this transaction violated their fiduciary duties as a
matter of clear law.
18. Plaintiffs in this action have calculated their damages using the "real options"
method. This is a standard method of valuing equity interests, which
emphasizes the value of the equity-holders right to decide whether to continue
or fold the business. I have taught coiporate finance to law students for many
years. The option theory method of valuing equity appears in each of the
standard law school corporate finance texts as a central part of the standard
understanding of how and why equity investments have value. (See, e.g.,
Carney, Corporate Finance, 539-540; Klein & Coffee, Business Organization
and Finance, 341-342; Bratton, Corporate Finance, 136, excerpts collectively
attached hereto as Exhibit R)
19. Attached is my expert report which is true, accurate, reliable, and provides my
opinions and the basis for my opinions in this case. Set forth in detail in my
report is my opinion that:
a. The directors and officers of Campus Pipeline breached their fiduciary
duty of loyalty because they had financial conflicts of interest in the
transaction, they took no measures to mitigate these conflicts of
interest or obtain independent advice, and they placed their own
personal interests and the interests of SCT ahead of the interests of
Campus Pipeline and its outside stockholders,
b. The officers and directors of Campus Pipeline breached their fiduciary
duty of care because they exercised no care in this transaction in
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failing to consider alternative course of action (including operating the

company or finding alternative transactions), and in instructing their
outside consultant, Thomas Weisel Partners to assume the very result
in needed to consider, and they were grossly negligent in terminating
the interests of the common stock for a payment of zero,
c. The directors and officers of Campus Pipeline breached their Revlon
duties, because when the sale of a company becomes inevitable it is
their sole duty to maximize the return to the common shareholders,
and Defendants approved a transaction that gave the common
shareholders nothing.
1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
this 21st day of November, 2006, at Hempstead, N.Y.

DANIEL JH GREENWOOD
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